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Moore’s refutation of Skeptic’s doubt of the existence of the external physical
world with ‘I know that this is a hand’ is interesting, while Wittgenstein’s remarks
on this issue, which has become the book named On Certainty (OC for short), is
more interesting.
OC dealt, but not exclusively with epistemology. My thesis focuses mainly on the
Hinge propositions, which is the core concept of OC, and its significance for
epistemology.
The chapter 2 mainly discusses the invalidation of Moore’s refutation and
Wittgenstein’s analysis concerning Skepticism. Moore and the Skeptic have the
same misunderstanding and use “know” and “doubt” metaphysically. Words only
have their meanings when being used in the ordinary language games, when it is
meaningful to ask ‘how do I know?’ and ‘how to remove my doubt?’, and these
questions can’t be answered in Moore’s and the Skeptic’s situation. Wittgenstein
exposes both Moore and the Skeptic’s misunderstanding of words when doing
Philosophy. This agrees with Wittgenstein’s bringing the words from the
metaphysical use down to the ordinary use.
The Chapter 3 and 4 elucidate the Hinge propositions. Wittgenstein is interested
by the Moorean propositions –i.e. the Hinge propositions-- because these
propositions look like absolute truth but meanwhile we can’t figure out how they
can become truth. The Chapter 3 shows Wittgenstein’s description of Hinge
propositions. His description is idiosyncratic: they can be basic beliefs, form of life
and the foundation of people are thinking and action, sometimes they can play a
logic role. This idiosyncratic description should be responsible for the disputes
among researchers. In Chapter 4, we link the Hinge propositions with another
concept---the “end” which often appears in Wittgenstein’s other writings. Actually,













verification, of doubt) is the Hinge propositions.
The Chapter 5 will deal with the relation between Hinge propositions and
foundationalism. While Hinge propositions are the foundations and frameworks of
language games, the foundations and frameworks themselves have no
foundations and justifications at all. This chapter will analyze the failure of using
pragmatism and empiricism to justify Hinge propositions, and suggest that the
mathematic and scientific propositions as well as the Hinge propositions that
‘human beings always do induction’ have no justification too. The Hinge
proposition’s certainty derives from the USE of human being, not that itself has
the logical priority. However, theorists can say that the discovery of Hinge
propositions can both lead to foundationalism and anti-foundationalism, because
of different understanding of the term ‘foundationalism’. As with language-games,
the explanation and justification always have an end, and the end has no
conceptual foundation. This is exactly the essential feature a Hinge proposition
has and the reason why we call Wittgenstein an anti-foundationalist on one hand.
On another hand, many kinds of praxis can’t be established if there were no ‘end’
or certainty, that is the reason why we call Wittgenstein a foundationalist.
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